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Abstract
In this paper we consider three descriptions, at different abstract levels, of the
leader election protocol from the IEEE 1394 serial multimedia bus. The descriptions
are given using the language Maude based on rewriting logic. Particularly, the time
aspects of the protocol are studied. The descriptions are first validated by an ex-
haustive exploration of all the possible behaviors and states reachable from an initial
configuration of a network, checking that always only one leader is chosen. The cor-
rectness of the protocol is showed by a formal proof that the desirable properties of
the protocol are always fulfilled.
Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 Informal overview of the protocol 1
3 Object-oriented specification in Maude 3
4 First description of the protocol (with synchronous communication) 4
5 Timed, asynchronous communication description 5
5.1 Time in rewriting logic and Maude . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.2 Second description of the protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.3 Third description of the protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.4 An example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6 Model-checking analysis 13
6.1 Maude’s metalevel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.2 Search strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.3 Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7 Formal proof 17
7.1 Verification of synchronous description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.2 Verification of second description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.2.1 Network properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.2.2 Safety properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.2.3 Liveness properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
7.2.4 Total correctness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
7.3 Verification of third description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
7.3.1 If there is a cycle in the network, an error message is generated. . . . . . . 24
7.3.2 Total correctness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
8 Conclusion 26
A Complete Maude specification 28
A.1 Synchronous communication description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
A.2 Timed, asynchronous communication description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
A.3 Search strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
A.4 Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
11 Introduction
Rewriting logic [Mes92, Mes98] and Maude [CDE+99, CDE+00b] have emerged as an ex-
cellent framework where communication protocols can be specified and analyzed [DMT98,
DMT00].
Rewriting logic was first proposed by Meseguer as a unified framework for concurrency
in 1990. Since then much work has been done on the use of rewriting logic as a logi-
cal and semantic framework [MOM93], and on the development of the Maude language
[CDE+99]. In the last few years the application of rewriting logic and Maude to the spec-
ification of real systems has started, mainly for applications of distributed architectures
and communication protocols [DMT98]. In [DMT00] a formal methodology for specify-
ing and analyzing communication protocols is presented. It is arranged as a sequence of
increasingly stronger methods, including:
1. Formal specification, in order to obtain a formal model of the system, in which
ambiguities are clarified.
2. Execution of the specification, for simulation and debugging purposes, leading to
better versions of the specification.
3. Formal model-checking analysis, in order to find errors by considering all possible
behaviors of highly distributed and nondeterministic systems.
4. Narrowing analysis, in which all behaviors from the possibly infinite set of states
described by a symbolic expression are analyzed.
5. Formal proof, where the correctness of critical properties is verified by using a formal
technique.
In this paper we use methods 1–3 to specify and analyze three descriptions of the
leader election protocol of IEEE 1394 serial multimedia bus (the “FireWire”), and we use
method 5 to verify them.
Although formal methods were not used in the development of the IEEE 1394 standard,
various aspects of the system have been described elsewhere using a variety of different
techniques, including I/O automata [DGRV97], µCRL [SvdZ98], and E-LOTOS [SV99].
Thus this example is becoming something of a benchmark for formal methods [MS00,
SMR01]. We show how Maude, a high-level language and high-performance system sup-
porting both equational and rewriting logic computation, can also be used as a formal
specification language. We use the object-oriented specification style of Maude [CDE+99],
which allows formalization of both synchronous and asynchronous concurrent object sys-
tems.
2 Informal overview of the protocol
The serial multimedia bus IEEE 1394 [IEE95] connects together systems and devices in
order to carry all forms of digitized video and audio quickly, reliably, and inexpensively.
Its architecture is scalable, and it is “hot-pluggable,” so a designer or user can add or
subtract systems and peripherals easily at any time. The IEEE 1394 as a whole is complex,
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Figure 1: Network configurations during the leader election protocol
comprising of several different subprotocols, each concerned with different tasks (e.g., data
transfer between nodes in the network, bus arbitration, leader election). The standard is
described in layers, in the style of OSI (Open Systems Interconnection), and each layer
is split into different phases [IEE95]. In this paper only the tree identify phase (leader
election) of the physical layer is described.
Informally, the tree identify phase of IEEE 1394 is a leader election protocol taking
place after a bus reset in the network (i.e., when a node is added to, or removed from, the
network). Immediately after a bus reset all nodes in the network have equal status, and
know only to which other nodes they are connected. A leader (root) must be elected to
serve as the bus manager for the other phases of the IEEE 1394. Figure 1(a) shows the
initial state of a possible network. Connections between nodes are indicated by solid lines.
The protocol is only successful if the original network is connected and acyclic.
Each node carries out a series of negotiations with its neighbors in order to establish
the direction of the parent-child relationship between them. More specifically, if a node
has n connections then it receives “be my parent” requests from all, or all but one, of its
connections.
Assuming n or n− 1 requests have been made, the node then moves into an acknowl-
edgement phase, where it sends acknowledgements “you are my child” to all the nodes
which sent “be my parent” in the previous phase. When all acknowledgements have been
sent, either the node has n children and therefore is the root node, or the node sends a “be
my parent” request on the so far unused connection and awaits an acknowledgement from
the parent. Leaf nodes skip the initial receive requests phase and move straight to this
point; they have only one connection and, therefore it must be their parent. Figure 1(b)
shows the instant when nodes d, f and g have their parents already decided (solid con-
nections with arrows pointing to the parent), and node b is asking node c to be its parent
3(the queried relationship is shown by a dotted line).
Communication between nodes is asynchronous; therefore it is possible that two nodes
might simultaneously request each other to be its parent, leading to root contention (each
wants the other to be the root, see Figure 1(c)). To resolve root contention, each node
selects a random Boolean. The value of the Boolean specifies a long or short wait before
resending the “be my parent” request. This may lead to contention again, but fairness
guarantees that eventually one node will become the root.
When all negotiations are concluded, the node which has established that it is the
parent of all its connected nodes must be the root node of a spanning tree of the network.
See Figure 1(d) in which node c is the root node.
3 Object-oriented specification in Maude
Before giving the protocol description, we present how object-oriented specifications are
written in Maude. This description has been extracted from [CDE+00b].
An object in a given state is represented as a term < O : C | a1 : v1,..., an : vn >
where O is the object’s name, belonging to a set Oid of object identifiers, C is its class, the
ai’s are the names of the object’s attributes, and the vi’s are their corresponding values.
Messages are defined by the user for each application.
In a concurrent object-oriented system the concurrent state, which is called a config-
uration, has the structure of a multiset made up of objects and messages that evolves by
concurrent rewriting (modulo the multiset structural axioms of associativity, commutativ-
ity, and identity) using rules that describe the effects of communication events between
some objects and messages. The rewrite rules in the module specify in a declarative way
the behavior associated with the messages. The general form of such rules is
M1 . . .Mn 〈O1 : F1 | atts1〉 . . . 〈Om : Fm | attsm〉
−→ 〈Oi1 : F
′
i1
| atts ′i1〉 . . . 〈Oik : F
′
ik
| atts ′ik〉
〈Q1 : D1 | atts
′′
1〉 . . . 〈Qp : Dp | atts
′′
p〉
M ′1 . . .M
′
q
if C
where k, p, q ≥ 0, the Ms are message expressions, i1, . . . , ik are different numbers among
the original 1, . . . ,m, and C is a rule condition. The result of applying a rewrite rule is
that the messages M1, . . . ,Mn disappear; the state and possibly the class of the objects
Oi1 , . . . , Oik may change; all the other objects Oj vanish; new objects Q1, . . . , Qp are
created; and new messages M ′1, . . . ,M
′
q are sent.
Since the above rule involves several objects and messages in its lefthand side, we say
that it is a synchronous rule. It is conceptually important to distinguish the special case
of rules involving at most one object and one message in their lefthand side. These rules
are called asynchronous and have the form
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(M) 〈O : F | atts〉
−→ (〈O : F ′ | atts ′〉)
〈Q1 : D1 | atts
′′
1〉 . . . 〈Qp : Dp | atts
′′
p〉
M ′1 . . .M
′
q
if C
By convention, the only object attributes made explicit in a rule are those relevant for
that rule. In particular, the attributes mentioned only in the lefthand side of the rule are
preserved unchanged, the original values of attributes mentioned only in the righthand side
of the rule do not matter, and all attributes not explicitly mentioned are left unchanged.
4 First description of the protocol (with synchronous com-
munication)
We begin with a simple description of the protocol, without time considerations, where
communication between nodes is assumed to be synchronous, i.e., a message is sent and
received simultaneously; therefore, there is no need for acknowledgements, and contention
cannot arise.
In the IEEE 1394 we have nodes and communications between nodes that relate nat-
urally to objects and messages. In this first description, nodes are represented by objects
of class Node with the following attributes:
• neig : SetIden, the set of identifiers of the neighbor nodes with whom this node has
not yet communicated. This is initialized to the set of all nodes (object identifiers)
connected to this node and decreases with every “be my parent” request until it is
either empty (and this node is the root) or it has one element (which is the parent
of this node); and
• done : Bool, a flag which is set when the tree identify phase of the protocol has
finished for this node, because it has been elected as the root node or because it
already knows which node is its parent.
Since communication is synchronous in this description, we do not need messages to
represent the “be my parent” requests or the acknowledgements. However, we add a
“leader” message which is sent by the elected leader to indicate that a leader has been
chosen. This provides us with a means of checking the requirement that a single leader is
eventually elected (see Section 6).
The following module introduces identifiers and sets of identifiers.
(fmod IDENTIFIERS is protecting QID .
sorts Iden SetIden .
subsorts Qid < Iden < SetIden .
op empty : -> SetIden .
op __ : SetIden SetIden -> SetIden [assoc comm id: empty] .
endfm)
5The object-oriented module describing the protocol starts declaring the node identifiers
as valid object identifiers, the class Node with its attributes, and the message leader:
(omod FIREWIRE-SYNC is protecting IDENTIFIERS .
subsort Iden < Oid .
class Node | neig : SetIden, done : Bool .
msg leader_ : Iden -> Msg .
Now we have to describe the node’s behavior by means of rewrite rules. The first rule
describes how a node J, which has only one identifier I in its attribute neig, sends a “be
my parent” request to the node I, and how node I receives the request and removes J
from its set of communications still to make; node J also finishes the identify phase by
setting the attribute done.
vars I J : Iden . var NEs : SetIden .
rl [rec] :
< I : Node | neig : J NEs, done : false >
< J : Node | neig : I, done : false >
=> < I : Node | neig : NEs > < J : Node | done : true > .
Note that nondeterminism arises when there are two connected nodes with only one
identifier in their attribute neig. Any one of them can act as the sender.
The other rule states when a node is elected as the leader.
rl [leader] :
< I : Node | neig : empty, done : false >
=> < I : Node | done : true > (leader I) .
endom)
5 Timed, asynchronous communication description
The previous description is very simple, but is not an accurate depiction of events in the
real protocol, where messages are sent along wires of variable length, and therefore message
passing is asynchronous and subject to delay. Since the communication is asynchronous,
acknowledgement messages are needed, and a particular problem arises when two nodes
might simultaneously request each other to be its parent, leading to root contention.
Using only the asynchronous explicit communication via messages of Maude leads us to a
description of the protocol which does not work as expected, in the sense that there is the
possibility that the root contention phase and the receive “be my parent” requests phase
alternate forever. Hence the timing aspects of the protocol cannot be ignored, and in the
root contention phase nodes have to wait a short or long (randomly chosen) time period
before resending the “be my parent” requests.
Before showing this new, timed description, we briefly summarize the ideas in [O¨lv00,
O¨M02] about how to introduce time in rewriting logic and Maude, and particularly in an
object-oriented specification.
6 5 TIMED, ASYNCHRONOUS COMMUNICATION DESCRIPTION
5.1 Time in rewriting logic and Maude
A real-time rewrite theory is a rewrite theory with a sort Time that represents the time
values, and which fulfills several properties, like being a commutative monoid (Time,+, 0)
with additional operations ≤, <, and −. (“monus”). We use the module TIMEDOMAIN
to represent the time values, with a sort Time whose values are the natural numbers,
and which is a subsort of the sort TimeInf, which in addition contains the constant INF
representing ∞ (see [O¨lv00]).
Rules are divided into tick rules, that model the elapse of time on a system, and
instantaneous rules, that model changes in (part of) the system and are assumed to take
zero time. To ensure that time advances uniformly in all the parts of a state, we need a new
sort ClockedSystem, with a free constructor {_|_} : State Time -> ClockedSystem.
In the term { s | t }, s denotes the global state and t denotes the total time elapsed in
a computation if in the initial state the clock had value 0. Uniform time elapse is then
ensured if every tick rule is of the form { s | t } −→ { s′ | t+τ }, where τ denotes the
duration of the rule. These rules are called global rules because they rewrite terms of sort
ClockedSystem. Other rules are called local rules, because they do not act on the system
as a whole, but only on some system components. Having local rules allows parallelism
because they can be applied to different parts of the system at the same time. Local rules
are always viewed as instantaneous rules that take zero time.
In general, it must also be ensured that time does not advance if instantaneous actions
have to be performed. Although in many cases it is possible to add conditions on the tick
rules such that time will not elapse if some time-critical rule is enabled (and this is our case
here, as explained below), a general approach is to divide the rules in a real-time rewrite
theory into eager and lazy rules, and use internal strategies to restrict the possible rewrites
by requiring that the application of eager rules takes precedence over the application of
lazy rules (see Section 6.2).
These ideas can also be applied to object-oriented systems [O¨M02]. In this case, the
global state will be a term of sort Configuration, and since it has a rich structure, it
is both natural and necessary to have an explicit operation δ denoting the effect of time
elapse on the whole state. In this way, the operation δ will be defined for each possible
element in a configuration of objects and messages, describing the effect of time on this
particular element, and there will be equations, as shown below, which distribute the effect
of time to the whole system. In this case, tick rules should be of the form { s | t } −→
{ δ(s, τ) | t+ τ }.
An operation mte giving the maximum time elapse permissible to ensure timeliness of
time-critical actions, and defined separately for each object and message, is also useful, as
we will see below. The following general module declares these operations, and how they
distribute over the elements (none is the empty configuration):
(omod TIMEDOOSYSTEM is protecting TIMEDOMAIN .
sorts State ClockedSystem .
subsort Configuration < State .
op ‘{_|_‘} : State Time -> ClockedSystem .
op delta : Configuration Time -> Configuration .
vars CF CF’ : Configuration . var T : Time .
eq delta(none, T) = none .
ceq delta(CF CF’, T) = delta(CF, T) delta(CF’, T)
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if CF =/= none and CF’ =/= none .
op mte : Configuration -> TimeInf .
eq mte(none) = INF .
ceq mte(CF CF’) = min(mte(CF), mte(CF’))
if CF =/= none and CF’ =/= none .
endom)
5.2 Second description of the protocol
In this second description each node passes through different phases (as explained in
Section 2) which are declared as follows:
(fmod PHASES is
sort Phase .
ops rec ack waitParent contention self : -> Phase .
endfm)
When a node is in the rec phase, it is receiving “be my parent” requests from its
neighbors. In the ack phase, the node sends acknowledgements “you are my child” to all
the nodes which sent “be my parent” in the previous phase. In the waitParent phase,
the node waits for the acknowledgement from its parent. In the contention phase, the
node waits a long or short time before resending the “be my parent” request. A node
is in the self phase when either it has been elected as the leader, or it has received the
acknowledgement from its parent.
The attributes of the class Node, defined in module FIREWIRE-ASYNC extending the
module TIMEDOOSYSTEM, are now the following:
class Node | neig : SetIden, children : SetIden,
phase : Phase, rootConDelay : DefTime .
The children attribute represents the set of children to be acknowledged; phase
represents the phase in which the node is; and rootConDelay is an alarm used in the
root contention phase. The sort DefTime extends Time, which represents the time values
[O¨M02], with a new constant noTimeValue used when the clock is disabled.
sort DefTime . subsort Time < DefTime .
op noTimeValue : -> DefTime .
In addition to the leader message, we introduce two new messages which have as
arguments the sender, the receiver, and the time needed to reach the receiver:
msg from_to_be‘my‘parent‘with‘delay_ : Iden Iden Time -> Msg .
msg from_to_acknowledgement‘with‘delay_ : Iden Iden Time -> Msg .
For example, the message from I to J be my parent with delay T denotes that a
“be my parent” request has been sent from node I to node J, and it will reach J in T
units of time. A message with delay 0 is urgent, in the sense that it has to be attended
by the receiver before time elapses. The mte operation will ensure that this requirement
is fulfilled, as we will see below.
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The first rule1 states that a node I in the rec phase, and with more than one neighbor,
can receive a “be my parent” request with delay 0 from its neighbor J. The identifier J is
stored in the children attribute:
vars I J K : Iden . vars NEs CHs : SetIden .
crl [rec] :
(from J to I be my parent with delay 0)
< I : Node | neig : J NEs, children : CHs, phase : rec >
=> < I : Node | neig : NEs, children : J CHs >
if NEs =/= empty .
When a node is in the rec phase and there is only one connection unused, either it
may move to the next phase, ack, or it can receive the last request before going into this
phase:
rl [recN-1] :
< I : Node | neig : J, children : CHs, phase : rec >
=> < I : Node | phase : ack > .
rl [recLeader] :
(from J to I be my parent with delay 0)
< I : Node | neig : J, children : CHs, phase : rec >
=> < I : Node | neig : empty, children : J CHs, phase : ack > .
In the acknowledgement phase the node sends acknowledgements “you are my child”
to all the nodes which previously sent “be my parent” requests:
rl [ack] :
< I : Node | children : J CHs, phase : ack >
=> < I : Node | children : CHs >
(from I to J acknowledgement with delay timeLink(I,J)) .
The operation timeLink : Iden Iden -> Time represents a table with the time val-
ues denoting the delays between nodes.
When all acknowledgements have been sent, either the node has the set neig empty
and therefore is the root node, or it sends a “be my parent” request on the so far unused
connection and awaits an acknowledgement from the parent. Note that leaf nodes skip
the initial receive requests phase and move straight to this point.
rl [ackLeader] :
< I : Node | neig : empty, children : empty, phase : ack >
=> < I : Node | phase : self > (leader I) .
rl [ackParent] :
< I : Node | neig : J, children : empty, phase : ack >
=> < I : Node | phase : waitParent >
(from I to J be my parent with delay timeLink(I,J)) .
1Although for the sake of simplicity we present here local rules rewriting terms of sort Configuration,
in fact in the full specification we use global rules that rewrite terms of sort ClockedSystem. This is done
in order to avoid, basically, problems with function mte which has Configuration as an argument sort.
See Appendix A.2 for complete code in third description.
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rl [wait1] :
(from J to I acknowledgement with delay 0)
< I : Node | neig : J, phase : waitParent >
=> < I : Node | phase : self > .
If a parent request has been sent, then the node waits for an acknowledgement. If
a parent request arrives instead, then the node and the originating node of the parent
request are in contention for leader.
In the IEEE 1394 standard, contention is resolved by choosing a random Boolean b
and waiting for a short or long time depending on b before sampling the relevant port
to check for a “be my parent” request from the other node. If the request is there then
this node should agree to be the root and send an acknowledgement to the other; if the
message is not present, then this node will resend its own “be my parent” request.
In our representation, a random Boolean is chosen (by means of the value N in the
random number generator RAN) and a wait time selected. If a “be my parent” request
arrives during that time then the wait aborts and the request is dealt with; if the wait
time expires then the node resends “be my parent.”
rl [wait2] :
(from J to I be my parent with delay 0)
< I : Node | neig : J, phase : waitParent >
< RAN : RandomNGen | seed : N >
=> < I : Node | phase : contention,
rootConDelay : if (N % 2 == 0) then ROOT-CONT-FAST
else ROOT-CONT-SLOW fi >
< RAN : RandomNGen | seed : random(N) > .
rl [contenReceive] :
(from J to I be my parent with delay 0)
< I : Node | neig : J, phase : contention >
=> < I : Node | neig : empty, children : J, phase : ack,
rootConDelay : noTimeValue > .
rl [contenSend] :
< I : Node | neig : J, phase : contention, rootConDelay : 0 >
=> < I : Node | phase : waitParent, rootConDelay : noTimeValue >
(from I to J be my parent with delay timeLink(I,J)) .
Objects of class RandomNGen are pseudorandom number generators. The class decla-
ration and the random operation are as follows:
class RandomNGen | seed : MachineInt .
op random : MachineInt -> MachineInt . *** next random number
var N : MachineInt .
eq random(N) = ((104 * N) + 7921) % 10609 .
We have to define now how time affects objects and messages, that is, we have to define
the delta operation denoting the effect of time elapse on objects and messages, and also
which is the maximum time elapse allowed (to ensure timeliness of time-critical actions)
by an object or message (following ideas developed in [O¨lv00, O¨M02]):
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vars T T’ : Time . var DT : DefTime .
eq delta(< I : Node | rootConDelay : DT >, T) =
if DT == noTimeValue then < I : Node | >
else < I : Node | rootConDelay : DT monus T > fi .
eq delta(< RAN : RandomNGen | >, T) = < RAN : RandomNGen | > .
eq delta(leader I, T) = leader I .
eq delta(from I to J be my parent with delay T, T’) =
from I to J be my parent with delay (T monus T’) .
eq delta(from I to J acknowledgement with delay T, T’) =
from I to J acknowledgement with delay (T monus T’) .
eq mte(< I : Node | neig : J K NEs, phase : rec >) = INF .
eq mte(< I : Node | neig : J, phase : rec >) = 0 .
eq mte(< I : Node | phase : ack >) = 0 .
eq mte(< I : Node | phase : waitParent >) = INF .
eq mte(< I : Node | phase : contention, rootConDelay : T >) = T .
eq mte(< I : Node | phase : self >) = INF .
eq mte(< RAN : RandomNGen | >) = INF .
eq mte( from I to J be my parent with delay T ) = T .
eq mte( from I to J acknowledgement with delay T ) = T .
eq mte( leader I ) = INF .
The tick rule that lets time pass if there is no rule that can be applied immediately is
as follows:
var C : Configuration .
crl [tick] : { C | T } => { delta(C, mte(C)) | T plus mte(C) }
if mte(C) =/= INF and mte(C) =/= 0 .
Due to our definition of the operation mte, this rule can only be applied when no other
rules are enabled.
5.3 Third description of the protocol
There are two timing considerations that we have not dealt with in the second description.
The first one is whether or not the CONFIG-TIMEOUT has been exceeded. This indicates
that the network has been set up incorrectly (i.e., it includes a loop) and an error has
to be reported. The second timing consideration concerns the force root parameter, fr.
Normally it is possible for a node to move to the ack phase when n − 1 communications
have been made (where n is the number of neighbors of the node). Setting fr forces
the node to wait a bit longer, in the hope that all n communications will be made (and
the node becomes the leader). These two considerations affect only the first phase of the
protocol, the receive “be my parent” requests phase.
The class Node is modified by adding three new attributes:
class Node | neig : SetIden, children : SetIden,
phase : Phase, rootConDelay : DefTime,
CONFIG-TIMEOUTalarm : DefTime,
fr : Bool, FORCE-ROOTalarm : DefTime .
The attribute CONFIG-TIMEOUTalarm is an alarm initialized with the time constant
CONFIG-TIMEOUT, and it is decreased when time elapses. If it reaches the value 0, the node
realizes that the network has a loop; an error is reported, via the following new message
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msg error : -> Msg .
and the node’s attribute phase is set to the new Phase value error.
The fr Boolean attribute is set to true when the node is intended to be the leader.
In this case, the FORCE-ROOTalarm attribute is initialized to the time constant FRTIME,
which determines how long a node delays going into the next phase although it has already
received “be my parent” requests from all but one of its neighbors. This alarm is also
decreased when time elapses, and when it reaches the value 0, it is turned off, setting its
value to noTimeValue and the fr attribute to false. If the fr attribute is initially false,
the FORCE-ROOTalarm is initialized to noTimeValue.
Let us now see how the rewrite rules are modified. The rec rule is not modified because
it is not affected by the new considerations. Two rules are added, controlling when the
alarms notify that the value 0 has been reached, and showing what has to be done in each
case:
rl [error] :
< I : Node | phase : rec, CONFIG-TIMEOUTalarm : 0 >
=> < I : Node | phase : error > error .
rl [stopAlarm] :
< I : Node | phase : rec, fr : true, FORCE-ROOTalarm : 0 >
=> < I : Node | fr : false, FORCE-ROOTalarm : noTimeValue > .
The recN-1 rule is modified because now a node in the rec phase moves to the next
phase only if its fr attribute has the value false. In this case both alarms are turned off:
rl [recN-1] :
< I : Node | neig : J, children : CHs, fr : false, phase : rec >
=> < I : Node | phase : ack, CONFIG-TIMEOUTalarm : noTimeValue,
FORCE-ROOTalarm : noTimeValue > .
Both alarms are also turned off if the last “be my parent” request is received while the
node is in the rec phase:
rl [recLeader] :
(from J to I be my parent with delay 0)
< I : Node | neig : J, children : CHs, phase : rec >
=> < I : Node | neig : empty, children : J CHs, phase : ack, fr : false,
FORCE-ROOTalarm : noTimeValue,
CONFIG-TIMEOUTalarm : noTimeValue > .
The rest of the rules, describing the next phases, are kept unmodified. However, the
operations delta and mte are redefined as follows:
eq delta(< A : Node | phase : rec, CONFIG-TIMEOUTalarm : DT,
FORCE-ROOTalarm : DT’ >, T) =
if DT == noTimeValue then
(if DT’ == noTimeValue then < A : Node | >
else < A : Node | FORCE-ROOTalarm : DT’ monus T >
fi)
else
(if DT’ == noTimeValue then
12 5 TIMED, ASYNCHRONOUS COMMUNICATION DESCRIPTION
< A : Node | CONFIG-TIMEOUTalarm : DT monus T >
else < A : Node | CONFIG-TIMEOUTalarm : DT monus T,
FORCE-ROOTalarm : DT’ monus T >
fi)
fi .
eq delta(< A : Node | phase : contention, rootConDelay : DT >, T) =
if DT == noTimeValue then < A : Node | >
else < A : Node | rootConDelay : DT monus T > fi .
ceq delta(< A : Node | phase : PH >, T) = < A : Node | >
if (PH == ack or PH == waitParent or PH == self or PH == error) .
eq delta( leader I, T ) = leader I .
eq delta( error, T ) = error .
eq delta( from I to J be my parent with delay T, T’) =
from I to J be my parent with delay (T monus T’) .
eq delta( from I to J acknowledgement with delay T, T’) =
from I to J acknowledgement with delay (T monus T’) .
eq mte( from I to J be my parent with delay T ) = T .
eq mte( from I to J acknowledgement with delay T ) = T .
eq mte( leader I ) = INF .
eq mte( error ) = INF .
eq mte(< A : Node | neig : I J NEs, phase : rec, CONFIG-TIMEOUTalarm : DT,
FORCE-ROOTalarm : DT’ >) =
if DT == noTimeValue then
(if DT’ == noTimeValue then INF else DT’ fi)
else
(if DT’ == noTimeValue then DT else min(DT, DT’) fi)
fi .
eq mte(< A : Node | neig : J, phase : rec, fr : true,
FORCE-ROOTalarm : T >) = T .
eq mte(< A : Node | neig : J, phase : rec, fr : false >) = 0 .
eq mte(< A : Node | phase : ack >) = 0 .
eq mte(< A : Node | phase : waitParent >) = INF .
eq mte(< A : Node | phase : contention, rootConDelay : T >) = T .
eq mte(< A : Node | phase : self >) = INF .
eq mte(< A : Node | phase : error >) = INF .
The complete code for this third decription can be found in Appendix A.2.
5.4 An example
The descriptions of the protocol are executable on the Maude system. We can take ad-
vantage of this fact in order to get confidence on the correctness of the protocol. First, we
define a configuration denoting the initial state of the network, in Figure 1(a), using the
timed description in Section 5.2.
(omod EXAMPLE is protecting FIREWIRE-ASYNC .
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op network7 : -> Configuration .
op dftATTRS : -> AttributeSet .
eq dftATTRS = children : empty, phase : rec,
rootConDelay : noTimeValue .
eq network7 = < ’Random : RandomNGen | seed : 13 >
< ’a : Node | neig : ’c, dftATTRS >
< ’b : Node | neig : ’c ’d, dftATTRS >
< ’c : Node | neig : ’a ’b ’e, dftATTRS >
< ’d : Node | neig : ’b, dftATTRS >
< ’e : Node | neig : ’c ’f ’g, dftATTRS >
< ’f : Node | neig : ’e, dftATTRS >
< ’g : Node | neig : ’e, dftATTRS > .
eq timeLink(’a,’c) = 7 . eq timeLink(’c,’a) = 7 .
eq timeLink(’b,’c) = 7 . eq timeLink(’c,’b) = 7 .
eq timeLink(’b,’d) = 10 . eq timeLink(’d,’b) = 10 .
eq timeLink(’c,’e) = 20 . eq timeLink(’e,’c) = 20 .
eq timeLink(’e,’f) = 8 . eq timeLink(’f,’e) = 8 .
eq timeLink(’e,’g) = 10 . eq timeLink(’g,’e) = 10 .
endom)
We can then ask the Maude system to rewrite the initial configuration by using its
default strategy:
Maude> (rew { network7 | 0 } .)
result ClockedSystem : { leader ’c
< ’e : Node | neig : ’c, restATTRS > < ’d : Node | neig : ’b, restATTRS >
< ’a : Node | neig : ’c, restATTRS > < ’f : Node | neig : ’e, restATTRS >
< ’b : Node | neig : ’c, restATTRS > < ’g : Node | neig : ’e, restATTRS >
< ’c : Node | neig : empty, restATTRS >
< ’Random : RandomNGen | seed : 9655 > | 920 }
where, in order to make the term presentation more readable, we have substituted by hand
the attributes which are the same for all nodes, as follows:
restATTRS = children : empty, phase : self, rootConDelay : noTimeValue
6 Model-checking analysis
There are two desirable properties that this protocol has to fulfill: A single leader is chosen
(safety), and a leader is eventually chosen (liveness).
We show in this section how the reflective capabilities of rewriting logic and Maude
[Cla00, CM01, CDE+99] can be used to show that the specifications of the protocols work
in the expected way when applied to a concrete network. This is done by checking that
these two properties are fulfilled at the end of the protocol in all possible behaviors of the
protocol starting with the initial configuration representing the concrete network.
6.1 Maude’s metalevel
Rewriting logic is reflective [Cla00, CM01], that is, there is a finitely presented rewrite
theory U that is universal in the sense that we can represent any finitely presented rewrite
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theory R (including U itself) and any terms t, t′ in R as terms R and t, t′ in U , and we
then have the following equivalence
R ⊢ t −→ t′ ⇔ U ⊢ 〈R, t〉 −→ 〈R, t′〉.
In Maude, key functionality of the universal theory U has been efficiently implemented
in the functional module META-LEVEL, where Maude terms are reified as elements of a
data type Term, Maude modules are reified as terms in a data type Module, the process of
reducing a term to normal form is reified by a function meta-reduce, and the process of
applying a rule of a system module to a subject term is reified by a function meta-apply
[CDE+99].
6.2 Search strategy
We validate our specifications by making an exhaustive exploration of all possible behaviors
in the tree of possible rewritings of a term representing the initial state of the network. In
this tree we search for all the irreducible terms and observe that in all irreducible, reachable
terms only one leader message exists. The depth-first strategy is based on the work
in [BMM98, CDE+00a]. The module implementing the search strategy is parameterized
with respect to a constant equal to the metarepresentation of the Maude module which we
want to work with. Hence we define a parameter theory with a constant MOD representing
the module, and a constant labels representing the list of labels of rewrite rules to be
applied:
(fth AMODULE is including META-LEVEL .
op MOD : -> Module .
op labels : -> QidList .
endfth)
The module containing the strategy, extending META-LEVEL, is then the parameterized
module SEARCH[M :: AMODULE]. The strategy controls the possible rewritings of a term
by means of the metalevel function meta-apply. The operation meta-apply returns one
of the possible one-step rewritings at the top level of a given term. We first define an
operation allRew that returns all the possible one-step sequential rewritings [Mes92] of a
given term T by using rewrite rules with labels in the list labels.
The operations needed to find all the possible rewritings are as follows:
op allRew : Term QidList -> TermList .
op topRew : Term Qid MachineInt -> TermList .
op lowerRew : Term Qid -> TermList .
var T : Term . var L : Qid . var LS : QidList .
eq allRew(T, nil) = ~ .
eq allRew(T, L LS) = topRew(T, L, 0), *** rew. at the top of T
lowerRew(T, L), *** rew. of (proper) subterms
allRew(T, LS) . *** rew. with labels LS
Now we can define an operation allSol to search in the (conceptual) tree of all pos-
sible rewritings of a term T for irreducible terms, that is, terms that cannot be rewritten
anymore.
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sort TermSet . subsort Term < TermSet .
op ‘{‘} : -> TermSet .
op _U_ : TermSet TermSet -> TermSet [assoc comm id: {}] .
eq T U T = T .
op allSol : Term -> TermSet .
op allSolDepth : TermList -> TermSet .
var TL : TermList .
eq allSol(T) = allSolDepth(meta-reduce(MOD,T)) .
eq allSolDepth(~) = {} .
eq allSolDepth( T ) =
if allRew(T, labels) == ~ then T
else allSolDepth(allRew(T, labels)) fi .
eq allSolDepth( (T, TL) ) =
if allRew(T, labels) == ~ then ( T U allSolDepth(TL) )
else allSolDepth((allRew(T, labels), TL)) fi .
Before looking at an example, we consider two possible modifications of this strategy.
First, let us consider that we have separated the protocol rules into eager and lazy rules
(as commented in Section 5.1). We can then modify the allSolDepth operation to ensure
that eager rules are applied first, and that lazy rules are applied only when there is no
eager rule enabled.
eq allSolDepth( T ) =
if allRew(T, eagerLabels) == ~ then
(if allRew(T, lazyLabels) == ~ then T
else allSolDepth(allRew(T, lazyLabels)) fi)
else allSolDepth(allRew(T, eagerLabels)) fi .
eq allSolDepth( (T, TL) ) =
if allRew(T, eagerLabels) == ~ then
(if allRew(T, lazyLabels) == ~ then ( T U allSolDepth(TL) )
else allSolDepth((allRew(T, lazyLabels), TL)) fi)
else allSolDepth((allRew(T, eagerLabels), TL)) fi .
Secondly, the strategy can also be modified in order to keep, for each term T, the
rewrite steps which have been done to reach T from the initial term. This is useful if an
error is found when validating the protocol; in this case, the path leading to the error
configuration shows a counterexample of the correctness of the protocol (see [DMT98]).
6.3 Example
We show now how the strategy is used to prove that the timed description of the protocol
always works well, in all possible behaviors, when applied to the concrete network in
module EXAMPLE (Section 5.4). In order to instantiate the generic module SEARCH, we
need the metarepresentation of module EXAMPLE. We use the Full Maude function up to
obtain the metarepresentation of a module or a term [CDE+99].
(mod META-FIREWIRE is
including META-LEVEL .
op METAFW : -> Module .
eq METAFW = up(EXAMPLE) .
endm)
We declare a view and instantiate the generic module SEARCH with it.
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(view ModuleFW from AMODULE to META-FIREWIRE is
op MOD to METAFW .
op labels to (’rec ’recN-1 ’recLeader ’ack ’ackLeader ’ackParent
’wait1 ’wait2 ’contenReceive ’contenSend ’tick) .
endv)
(mod SEARCH-FW is
protecting SEARCH[ModuleFW] .
endm)
Now we can test the example. Since, in this case, only one solution is found (modulo
idempotency) we can use the down operation (which is in a sense inverse to up) in order
to display the output in a more readable form. The Maude result is as follows:
Maude> (down EXAMPLE : red allSol(up(EXAMPLE, { network7 | 0 })) .)
result ClockedSystem : { leader ’c
< ’e : Node | neig : ’c, restATTRS > < ’d : Node | neig : ’b, restATTRS >
< ’a : Node | neig : ’c, restATTRS > < ’f : Node | neig : ’e, restATTRS >
< ’b : Node | neig : ’c, restATTRS > < ’g : Node | neig : ’e, restATTRS >
< ’c : Node | neig : empty, restATTRS >
< ’Random : RandomNGen | seed : 9655 > | 920 }
We observe that only one leader has been elected, and that the reached configuration
is the one in Figure 1(d).
Now, we test the protocol with a network where two final configurations can be reached.
The network and the Maude module defining it are as follows:
c
b
a
e
f
g
7
7 7
7
40
(omod EXAMPLE is protecting FIREWIRE-ASYNC .
op network6 : -> Configuration .
op dftATTRS : -> AttributeSet .
eq dftATTRS = children : empty, phase : rec, rootConDelay : noTimeValue .
eq network6 = < ’a : Node | neig : ’c, defaultATTRS >
< ’b : Node | neig : ’c, defaultATTRS >
< ’c : Node | neig : ’a ’b ’e, defaultATTRS >
< ’e : Node | neig : ’c ’f ’g, defaultATTRS >
< ’f : Node | neig : ’e, defaultATTRS >
< ’g : Node | neig : ’e, defaultATTRS >
< ’Random : RandomNGen | seed : 13 > .
eq timeLink(’a,’b) = 10 . eq timeLink(’a,’c) = 7 .
eq timeLink(’c,’e) = 40 . eq timeLink(’e,’f) = 7 .
eq timeLink(’e,’g) = 7 .
var I J : Qid . ceq timeLink(J,I) = timeLink(I,J) if I < J .
endom)
After instantiating the search strategy with the metarepresentation of this new EXAMPLE
module, we can ask Maude to search all the reachable final configurations. All of them
have only one leader chosen, as expected.
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Maude> (down EXAMPLE : red allSol(up(EXAMPLE, { network6 | 0 })) .)
result ClockedSystem : { leader ’c
< ’e : Node | neig : ’c, restATTRS > < ’a : Node | neig : ’c, restATTRS >
< ’c : Node | neig : empty, restATTRS > < ’b : Node | neig : ’c, restATTRS >
< ’f : Node | neig : ’e, restATTRS > < ’g : Node | neig : ’e, restATTRS >
< ’Random : RandomNGen | seed : 9655 > | 997 }
& { leader ’e
< ’e : Node | neig : empty, restATTRS > < ’a : Node | neig : ’c, restATTRS >
< ’c : Node | neig : ’e, restATTRS > < ’b : Node | neig : ’c, restATTRS >
< ’f : Node | neig : ’e, restATTRS > < ’g : Node | neig : ’e, restATTRS >
< ’Random : RandomNGen | seed : 9655 > | 997 }
7 Formal proof
The desirable properties for this protocol are that a single leader is chosen, and that this
leader is eventually chosen, as stated in Section 6. To prove them, we define observations
that allow us to state properties of a configuration of the system. Then we observe the
changes made by the rewrite rules in the configurations until the leader is chosen.
7.1 Verification of synchronous description
For the synchronous case, we define the following observation:
• nodes is a set of pairs 〈A;S〉 where A is a network node identifier and S is the set
of nodes such that B ∈ S iff both < A : Node | neig : B NEs, done : false >
and < B : Node | done : false > appear in the configuration.
If we take the second component of each pair 〈A;S〉 to be the adjacency list of the
node represented in the first component, then nodes represents a network (directed graph)
with the nodes in the initial configuration for which the protocol has not finished yet.
We assume that the network is initially correct, in the sense that the set nodes repre-
sents a symmetric (that is, the links are bidirectional), connected, and acyclic network. We
have checked that if these conditions are fulfilled initially, then they are always fulfilled.
The desirable properties of the protocol are derived by induction from the following:
1. If there are at least two pairs in nodes then the rule rec can be applied. We know
that if |nodes| ≥ 2, then there exist A and B such that < A ; B > in nodes, because it
is connected and acyclic. Since the network is symmetric, we know that there exists
NEs such that < B ; A NEs > in nodes. Thus, the rule rec can be applied.
2. The cardinality of nodes always decreases in one unit when a rule is applied. The
proof is straightforward from the rules that model the system.
3. Since nodes is symmetric, if there is only one pair < A ; S > in nodes, its set of
neighbors S is empty.
4. Since nodes is connected and symmetric, there may be at most one element in nodes
such that its set of neighbors is empty.
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7.2 Verification of second description
The method above is extended in order to prove the correctness of the timed description.
The main idea is to have different observations for the sets of nodes in each phase and
look for sets of nodes that represent symmetric, connected, and acyclic networks. We will
prove that if the sets are not empty then some actions can take place, and the number of
elements in the sets decreases until all sets are empty.
Given a configuration of objects and messages, we consider the following observations
defined by sets of pairs:
RecN : < A ; B NEs CHs > in RecN , N > 0 iff
< A : Node | neig : B NEs, children : CHs, phase : rec >,
where N is the number of node identifiers in the node’s attribute neig.
AckC : < A ; B CHs> in AckC , C > 0 iff
< A : Node | neig : B, children : CHs, phase : ack > or
< A : Node | neig : empty, children : B CHs, phase : ack >
where C is the number of node identifiers in the node’s attribute children.
Ack0 : < A ; B > in Ack0 iff
< A : Node | neig : B, children : empty, phase : ack >,
< A ; empty > in Ack0 iff
< A : Node | neig : empty, children : empty, phase : ack >
Wait : < A ; B > in Wait iff < A : Node | neig : B, phase : waitParent >
and there is no message from B to A acknowledgement with delay T
in the system.
ContentionT : < A ; B > in ContentionT iff
< A : Node | neig : B, phase : contention, rootConDelay : T >
where T is the value of the rootConDelay attribute.
All the sets are pairwise disjoint, since a node cannot be in two phases at the same
time.
7.2.1 Network properties
Now, the set Nodes is defined by:
Nodes =
⋃
N
RecN ∪
⋃
C
AckC ∪
⋃
T
ContentionT ∪Wait.
There are not two pairs in Nodes with the same first component; then, if we take the
second component of each pair to be the adjacency list of the node represented in the first
component, Nodes represents a network (directed graph), and initially Nodes =
⋃
N RecN ,
because all the other subsets are empty. Notice that the set containing only the pair < A
; empty > represents a network with only one node.
If
⋃
N RecN represents, at the beginning, a symmetric, connected and acyclic network,
then Nodes represents always a symmetric, connected and acyclic network.
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Nodes is symmetric. If Nodes represents a symmetric network, in the sense that if we
have a link between nodes A and B then we also have a link between nodes B and
A, then it will always represent a symmetric network. We have checked that when
we apply a rewrite rule, either a pair is removed from one subset but it is added
to another one, or both < A ; B NEs CHs> and < B ; A NEs’ CHs’> are removed
from Nodes, or both are added to it.
Nodes is connected. We prove that, if Nodes represents at the beginning a connected
network, it will always represent a connected network, by checking that when a pair
is removed from the set Nodes, it is either of the form < A ; B > or < A ; empty >
and this means that it represents a leaf of the network, that is, it is connected to at
most one other node. Then, by removing only leaves, the network is still connected.
States in which pairs have been removed from Nodes are reached by applying one of
the following rewrite rules:
• ackLeader. Looking at the lefthand side of the rule, it is required that the
node is in phase ack and the neig and children attributes are both empty;
therefore, the pair that represents the observation is like < A ; empty >.
• ack. When this rule is applied the message from A to B acknowledgement
with delay T is added to the system, then the pair < B ; A > is removed
from the set Nodes since it should be in the subset Wait. If this rule is applied,
it is because B is in the children attribute of A, and this means that a “be my
parent” request was previously sent from B to A. Then, node B has been in phase
waitParent, and it must still be in this phase, since no other acknowledgement
message could be in the system. Thus, when ack is applied, we stop observing
node B, because we are sure that rule wait1 will be applied and node B will
reach phase self.
Nodes has no cycles. If Nodes represents at the beginning an acyclic network, it will
always represent an acyclic network. Since none of the rewrite rules introduces new
pairs in Nodes and since at the beginning it is acyclic, then cycles cannot be created.
7.2.2 Safety properties
Informally speaking, we prove that a single leader is chosen by proving that if a rewrite
rule is applied in the system, at most one node is removed from the network represented by
the set Nodes. Then if the algorithm finishes, that is, if the set Nodes becomes empty, at
the end the network represented by Nodes will have only one node that will be represented
by a pair of the form < A ; empty >. Hence the rule ackLeader can be applied and a
leader is declared. There cannot be more than one leader, since the network is connected.
If the set Nodes becomes empty, there should be a leader. Two rules remove pairs
from Nodes:
• ack. If we observe the state reached when we apply this rule, we have removed
a node identifier B from the second component of a pair < A ; B CHs >, and a
pair of the form < B ; A >. In the network represented by Nodes this means
that we have removed node B from the network.
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• ackLeader. If we observe the state reached when we apply this rule, we have
removed a pair of the form < A ; empty > from the set Nodes, and this means
that we have removed node A from the network.
In both cases we remove only one node from the network represented by Nodes each
time we apply a rewrite rule. If Nodes becomes empty, at the end the network should
have only one node which is of the form < A ; empty >. Then we can apply rule
ackLeader and a leader is chosen.
There is only one leader. Since the network represented by Nodes is always connected,
there can only be a pair of the form < A ; empty > in Nodes if the network has
only one node. Since we do not add nodes to the network, we can only have one
leader.
7.2.3 Liveness properties
Informally speaking, we prove that if there are pairs in Nodes then we can apply some
rewrite rule in the system, and if we apply a rule, some positive number that depends on
the pairs in Nodes decreases, and becomes zero when there are no more pairs in Nodes.
Then Nodes should become empty, which means that the algorithm has finished. The
contention phase presents some problems, since the function does not decrease sometimes
when the rules that treat the contention are applied. In this part we prove termination
using the assumption that we are in a fair system and contention cannot occur forever.
Property 1: If there are pairs in Nodes, then there is at least one rule that
can be applied in the system.
Since the network represented by the pairs in Nodes is acyclic, then either the network
has only one node, or the network has at least one leaf, that is, there is a pair of the
form < A ; B CHs > in Nodes with B the only value in the neig attribute of node A. In
the first case we can apply rule ackLeader. In the second case, and since the network is
symmetric, there is < B ; A NEs CHs’ > in Nodes. Table 1 shows the rewrite rules that
can be applied for each pair of nodes. When the second pair is not present, it means that
it does not matter the subset in which the pair is. In the cases the rewrite rule is tick,
we mean that this rule can be applied if there is no time-critical rule that can be applied.
Property 2: A node can only come into the contention phase a finite number
of times.
Now we prove that in a fair system, and assuming that
ROOT-CONT-FAST≫ max{I,J}(timeLink(I,J)) (1)
ROOT-CONT-SLOW≫ max{I,J}(timeLink(I,J)) (2)
ROOT-CONT-FAST− ROOT-CONT-SLOW≫ max{I,J}(timeLink(I,J)) (3)
a node cannot be forever changing between the contention and waitParent phases by
applying rules wait2 and contenSend; equivalently, the rewrite rule contenReceive will
be applied.
We mean by fairness that all the rewrite rules that can be applied will be applied,
and that the random number generator produces even and odd numbers and therefore the
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First pair Second pair Rewrite rule
< A ; B CHs > ∈ Rec1 recN-1
< A ; B CHs > ∈ AckN ack
< A ; B > ∈ Ack0 ackParent
< A ; B > ∈Wait < B ; A NEs CHs > ∈ RecN rec
A to B be my parent delay 0
< B ; A NEs CHs > ∈ RecN tick
A to B be my parent delay T
< B ; A CHs > ∈ Rec1 recN-1
< B ; A CHs > ∈ AckN ack
< B ; A CHs > ∈ Ack0 ackParent
< B ; A CHs > ∈Wait wait2
A to B be my parent delay 0
< B ; A CHs > ∈Wait tick
A to B be my parent delay T
< B ; A CHs > ∈Wait wait2
B to A be my parent delay 0
< B ; A CHs > ∈Wait tick
B to A be my parent delay T
< B ; A CHs > ∈ ContentionT tick
< B ; A CHs > ∈ Contention0 contenSend
< A ; B > ∈ ContentionT tick
< A ; B > ∈ Contention0 contenSend
Table 1: Rules that can be applied in the system
A contention
B contention
RA
A waitParent
B contention
from A to B delay T1
T1
A waitParent
B ack
Figure 2: Contention possibility 1 where RA < RB
rootConDelay attribute of a node in the contention phase can be either ROOT-CONT-FAST
or ROOT-CONT-SLOW. Equations 1, 2, and 3 express that both constants are much greater
than the maximum link delay between the nodes, and that their difference is also much
greater [IEE95].
The configurations we can have when the contention takes places are the following
ones:
1. Both nodes are in phase contention. Then,
• If RA < RB , where RA is the rootConDelay constant selected by node A, the
system reaches the moment in time RA and, by means of the contenSend rule,
A goes into the waitParent phase and a message from A to B be my parent
with delay T1 is sent. Then by assumption 3, the moment in time T1 occurs
before RB and this message reaches node B when it is still in phase contention.
Then node B will go into phase ack by means of the contenReceive rule. This
situation corresponds to Figure 2.
• If RB < RA, the situation is symmetric to the previous one, and node A will go
into phase ack.
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A contention
B contention
RA = RB
A waitParent
B contention
from A to B delay T1
RA = RB
A waitParent
B waitParent
from A to B delay T1
from B to A delay T2
Figure 3: Contention possibility 1 where RA = RB
A contention
B waitParent
from A to B delay T1
T1
A contention
B contention
Figure 4: Contention possibility 2
• If RA = RB , then RA and RB occur simultaneously, and the system will ap-
ply the contenSend rule to both nodes before the time of the “be my par-
ent” message of the first node that applies the contenSend rule has been con-
sumed. This means that both nodes will go into the waitParent phase and the
two messages from A to B be my parent with delay T1 and from B to A
be my parent with delay T2 will be in the system. Now we are in the initial
configuration 4 (see below) and both nodes will go again into the contention
phase. This situation is depicted in Figure 3, where we suppose that the rule
contenSend is first applied to node A by the system.
In this case, we make use of the fact that we are in a fair system and the
constants selected by A and B will be in some moment different and therefore
we will not have this case forever.
2. Node A is in phase contention, node B is in phase waitParent, and there is a
message from A to B be my parent with delay T1 in the system. Then, by as-
sumptions 1 and 2, T1 occurs before RA, and by means of the wait2 rule B goes into
the contention phase, and we are in case 1. See Figure 4.
3. Node A is in phase waitParent, node B is in phase contention, and there is a
message from B to A be my parent with delay T2 in the system. This situation
is symmetric to case 2.
4. Both nodes are in the waitParent phase, and there are two messages from A to B
be my parent with delay T1 and from B to A be my parent with delay T2 in
the system. Then, by assumptions 1 and 2, both T1 and T2 occur before any of the
RA and RB can take place. This means that both A and B go into the contention
phase, and we are again back in the first case. See Figure 5.
If a node goes out of the contention phase by means of the contenReceive rule, it will
not go back to the contention phase since it will be in the ack phase with no neighbors.
Then, the only rules that can be applied to it are first ack, and then ackLeader.
Property 3: Application of rules decreases f(Configuration).
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A waitParent
B waitParent
from A to B delay T1
from B to A delay T2
T1
A waitParent
B contention
from B to A delay T ′
T2
A contention
B contention
Figure 5: Contention possibility 4
Before the rule Rule After the rule
5 ∗N ∗ T ∗ n rec 5 ∗N ∗ T ∗ (n− 1)− 1
5 ∗N ∗ T recN-1 4 ∗ T ∗ (n+ 1) ≤ 4 ∗ T ∗N
5 ∗N ∗ T recLeader 4 ∗ T ∗ (n+ 1)− 1 < 4 ∗ T ∗N
4 ∗ T ∗ (n+ 1) ack ≤ 4 ∗ T ∗ n+ T + 1
4 ∗ T ackLeader 0
4 ∗ T ackParent ≤ 2 + T
1 wait1 0
2 wait2 0
f(C) tick f(C)− mte(C) ∗ nm(C)
Table 2: Values of function f
Let N be the total number of nodes in the network and T the maximum delay of the
timeLink table. We define:
rec(I) =
{
5 ∗N ∗ T ∗ n if < I ; NEs > ∈ Recn
0 otherwise
ack(I) =
{
4 ∗ T ∗ (n+ 1) if < I ; J CHs > ∈ Ackn
0 otherwise
wait(I) =
{
1 if < I ; J > ∈Wait
0 otherwise
nm(C) = number of messages with time in configuration C
times(C) = sum of times in messages in configuration C
Consider the function
f(C) =
( ∑
I∈Node
rec(I)+ ack(I)+ wait(I)
)
+ nm(C) + times(C) .
We show in Table 2 the value of the function f in a configuration and the value of the
same function after we have applied a rewrite rule in the system to the configuration. All
the values are relative, in the sense that they only represent the value of the substate that
changes when the rewrite rule is applied. We observe that in all cases the value of the
function decreases.
Rules contenReceive and contenSend are not represented in the table because they
do not decrease the value of the function, but on the contrary, they increase it. This does
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not matter since we have proved above that these rules cannot be applied forever for a
pair of nodes, and that if two nodes solve their contention they will not have another
contention.
Since f(C) ≥ 0 and it decreases when we apply the rewrite rules, then, although it can
be increased by a finite quantity, we conclude that we cannot apply rewrite rules forever
in the system.
7.2.4 Total correctness
Since we cannot apply rules forever in the system (Property 3), the set Nodes should
become empty (Property 1), and if this set becomes empty there should be one and only
one leader (Section 7.2.2).
7.3 Verification of third description
First we will prove that by using this description of the protocol cycles are detected.
Then we will show how the new rules affect the proof of correctness given for the timed
asynchronous description with no cycle detection in Section 7.2.
7.3.1 If there is a cycle in the network, an error message is generated.
Property 1: If a node is in a cycle, then it does not change from the rec phase
until an error message is generated.
If the node is in a cycle it has at least two neighbours. The rules that change a node
from the rec phase are recN-1 and recLeader, which cannot be applied since the node
has more than one neighbour, and error, which generates the error message.
Property 2: If the network has a cycle, then the CONFIG-TIMEOUTalarm attribute
of some node that is in the cycle is set to 0.
We divide the set of nodes in two subsets: one with the nodes that are in a cycle, and
the other with the nodes that are not in a cycle. If a node is not in a cycle, there are a
finite number of rewrites that can take place before it reaches the self phase. If a node is
in a cycle, rule rec can be applied at most as many times as the number of nodes in the
network that are connected to this node but are not in the cycle. Once there is no rewrite
rule different from tick that can be applied to the nodes, only time can pass changing the
CONFIG-TIMEOUTalarm attribute. This attribute will decrease in the nodes of the cycle
until some of them become 0.
Property 3: If the CONFIG-TIMEOUTalarm attribute of a node is set to 0 and the
node does not change from the rec phase, the value of the CONFIG-TIMEOUTalarm
attribute does not change any more.
The rules that change the value of the CONFIG-TIMEOUTalarm attribute are:
• recN-1 and recLeader, that change the phase of the node to the ack phase.
• tick, that decreases the value of the attribute. But this rule cannot be applied
if the CONFIG-TIMEOUTalarm attribute is 0, since in this case the mte operation is
evaluated to 0.
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• error, that changes the phase of the node to the error phase.
Property 4: If there is a cycle in the network then an error is generated.
By Properties 2 and 3, there is a node whose CONFIG-TIMEOUTalarm attribute is set to
0, and this value cannot change, and by Property 1, the node should be in the rec phase.
Looking at the lefthand side of the error rewrite rule we check that it can be applied,
and since we assume that we are in a fair system the error message will be generated.
7.3.2 Total correctness
We will prove that, if there is no error, a single leader is chosen and that the leader is
eventually chosen. We can extend the method used in the previous proofs in Section 7.2
in order to deal with the new rules and the rules that have changed.
We consider the same observations as in the case with no cycle detection, since although
we have introduced a new phase, error, this is a final phase in the sense that once a node
is in that phase there is no rewrite rule in the system that can be applied to it.
Since we suppose that there is no error, we also have that the network represented by
the set Nodes is symmetric, connected, and with no cycles.
The proof of the safety properties does not change, since we suppose that there is
no error, and then we do not introduce any rewrite rule that removes pairs from the set
Nodes.
The proof of the liveness properties is slightly changed. First, Property 1 of Section
7.2.3 needs to take into account the new definition of the recN-1 rewrite rule. If the first
pair < A ; B Chs > ∈ Rec1 then we have the following additional cases for Table 1:
• if fr is false then apply rule recN-1;
• if FORCE-ROOTalarm is 0 and fr is true then apply rule stopAlarm;
• if FORCE-ROOTalarm is greater than 0 and fr is true then apply rule tick.
The proof of Property 2 does not change, since the new rules do not affect the
contention phase.
For Property 3, we check that the new rules decrease the function’s value. We change
the function definition of nm(C) and times(C) to take into account also objects with time
values:
nm(C) = number of objects and messages with time not equal to noTimeValue
in configuration C
times(C) = sum of times in objects and messages in configuration C
• Rule error: the function has a value of 5 ∗ N ∗ T ∗ n + 1 before we apply the rule
and 0 after the rule is applied.
• Rule stopAlarm: the function has a value of 5 ∗N ∗ T ∗ n + 1 before we apply the
rule and 5 ∗N ∗ T ∗ n after the rule is applied.
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• Rule recN-1: the function has a value of 5 ∗ N ∗ T before we apply the rule and
4 ∗ T ∗ (n+ 1) after the rule is applied.
• Rule recLeader: the function has a value of 5 ∗N ∗ T + 1 before we apply the rule
and 4 ∗ T ∗ (n+ 1) after the rule is applied.
Since the three properties are verified, the liveness property is fulfilled and therefore
we have total correctness, as before.
8 Conclusion
We have shown how rewriting logic and Maude can be used to specify and analyze at
different abstract levels a communication protocol such as the FireWire leader election
protocol. We have also shown how the timing aspects of the protocol can be modeled
in an easy and structured way in rewriting logic, by means of operations that define the
effect of time elapse and rewrite rules that let time pass.
We see this work as another contribution to the research area of specification and
analysis of several kinds of communication protocols in Maude, as described in [DMT98,
DMT00], as well as to the development of the formal methodology that we have sum-
marized in the introduction. As far as we know, this paper describes the first examples
where the strongest method of formal proof has been applied to a protocol in the context
of Maude programs. In our opinion, it is necessary to have more examples in order to
consolidate this methodology, and to develop tools that can help in the simulation and
analysis of such examples.
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A Complete Maude specification
A.1 Synchronous communication description
(fmod IDENTIFIERS is
protecting QID .
sorts Iden SetIden .
subsorts Qid < Iden < SetIden .
op empty : -> SetIden .
op __ : SetIden SetIden -> SetIden [assoc comm id: empty] .
endfm)
(omod FIREWIRE is
protecting IDENTIFIERS .
subsort Iden < Oid .
class Node | neig : SetIden, done : Bool .
msg leader_ : Iden -> Msg .
sort System .
op ‘{_‘} : Configuration -> System .
vars I J : Iden .
var NEs : SetIden .
var C : Configuration .
rl [rec] :
{ < I : Node | neig : J NEs, done : false >
< J : Node | neig : I, done : false > C }
=> { < I : Node | neig : NEs >
< J : Node | done : true > C } .
rl [ackLeader] :
{ < I : Node | neig : empty, done : false > C }
=> { < I : Node | done : true > (leader I) C } .
endom)
A.2 Timed, asynchronous communication description
The following diagram shows module importation, and helps to understand the module
structure in this description of the protocol.
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TIMEDEXAMPLE
TIMEDFIREWIRE
RANDOM
TIMEDOOSYSTEM
TIMEDOMAIN
NAT-INF
IDENTIFIERS TIMEDPHASES
(fmod NAT-INF is
protecting MACHINE-INT .
sorts Nat NzNat NatInf .
subsort Nat < MachineInt .
subsort NzNat < Nat .
subsort NzNat < NzMachineInt .
subsort Nat < NatInf .
var NZ : NzMachineInt .
mb 0 : Nat .
cmb NZ : NzNat if NZ > 0 .
op INF : -> NatInf .
op _plus_ : NatInf NatInf -> NatInf [assoc comm] .
op _monus_ : NatInf Nat -> NatInf .
op _lt_ : NatInf NatInf -> Bool .
op _le_ : NatInf NatInf -> Bool .
op min : NatInf NatInf -> NatInf [comm] .
op max : NatInf NatInf -> NatInf [comm] .
vars N N’ : Nat .
vars NI NI’ : NatInf .
eq N plus N’ = N + N’ .
eq NI plus INF = INF .
eq N monus N’ = if N lt N’ then 0 else (N - N’) fi .
eq INF monus N’ = INF .
eq N lt N’ = N < N’ .
eq N lt INF = true .
eq INF lt NI = false .
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eq N le N’ = N <= N’ .
eq NI le INF = true .
eq INF le N = false .
ceq min(NI, NI’) = NI if NI le NI’ .
ceq max(NI, NI’) = NI’ if NI le NI’ .
endfm)
(fmod TIMEDOMAIN is
protecting NAT-INF .
sorts Time TimeInf .
subsorts Nat < Time < TimeInf .
subsort NatInf < TimeInf .
sorts DefTime DefTimeInf .
subsorts Time < DefTime < DefTimeInf .
subsort TimeInf < DefTimeInf .
op noTimeValue : -> DefTime .
endfm)
(omod TIMEDOOSYSTEM is
protecting TIMEDOMAIN .
protecting QID .
sorts State ClockedSystem .
subsort Configuration < State .
op ‘{_|_‘} : State Time -> ClockedSystem .
subsort Qid < Oid .
*** delta denotes what happens to a configuration when time acts on it:
op delta : Configuration Time -> Configuration .
vars CF CF’ : Configuration .
var T : Time .
eq delta(none, T) = none .
ceq delta(CF CF’, T) = delta(CF, T) delta(CF’, T)
if CF =/= none and CF’ =/= none .
*** mte, Maximum Time Elapse, says how much the time can elapse
*** on the current state in a "timely" way. That is, time
*** elapse should stop at the time when some time-critical action
*** should take place:
op mte : Configuration -> TimeInf .
eq mte(none) = INF .
ceq mte(CF CF’) = min(mte(CF), mte(CF’)) if CF =/= none and CF’ =/= none .
endom)
(fmod TIMEDPHASES is
sort Phase .
ops rec ack waitParent contention self error : -> Phase .
endfm)
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(omod RANDOM is
protecting TIMEDOOSYSTEM .
class RandomNGen | seed : MachineInt .
op random : MachineInt -> MachineInt .
*** random(x) generates the next random number
var N : MachineInt .
var T : Time .
var RAN : Oid .
eq random(N) = ((104 * N) + 7921) % 10609 .
*** Obeys Knuths criteria for a "good" random function
*** Timed behaviour
eq delta(< RAN : RandomNGen | >, T) = < RAN : RandomNGen | > .
eq mte(< RAN : RandomNGen | >) = INF .
endom)
(omod TIMEDFIREWIRE is
protecting IDENTIFIERS .
protecting TIMEDPHASES .
protecting RANDOM .
class Node | neig : SetIden, children : SetIden, phase : Phase,
rootConDelay : DefTime, CONFIG-TIMEOUTalarm : DefTime,
fr : Bool, FORCE-ROOTalarm : DefTime .
msg from_to_be‘my‘parent‘with‘delay_ : Iden Iden Time -> Msg .
msg from_to_acknowledgement‘with‘delay_ : Iden Iden Time -> Msg .
msg leader_ : Iden -> Msg .
msg error : -> Msg .
*** Time constants
ops ROOT-CONTEND-FAST ROOT-CONTEND-SLOW CONFIG-TIMEOUT FRTIME : -> Time .
eq ROOT-CONTEND-FAST = 250 .
eq ROOT-CONTEND-SLOW = 580 .
eq CONFIG-TIMEOUT = 166600 .
eq FRTIME = 84000 .
op timeLink : Iden Iden -> Time .
var RAN : Oid .
var PH : Phase .
vars I J K : Iden .
vars NEs CHs : SetIden .
var C : Configuration .
vars T T’ : Time .
vars DT DT’ : DefTime .
var N : Nat .
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*** Nodes receive "be my parent" requests until n or n-1 requests
*** have been made (where n is the number of neighbours of the node)
crl [rec] :
{ < I : Node | neig : J NEs, children : CHs, phase : rec >
(from J to I be my parent with delay 0) C | T }
=> { < I : Node | neig : NEs, children : J CHs > C | T }
if NEs =/= empty .
rl [error] :
{ < I : Node | phase : rec, CONFIG-TIMEOUTalarm : 0 > C | T }
=> { < I : Node | phase : error > error C | T } .
rl [stopAlarm] :
{ < I : Node | phase : rec, fr : true, FORCE-ROOTalarm : 0 > C | T }
=> { < I : Node | fr : false, FORCE-ROOTalarm : noTimeValue > C | T } .
*** Assuming n or n-1 requests have been made, the node then moves
*** into an acknowledgement phase.
rl [recN-1] :
{ < I : Node | neig : J, children : CHs, fr : false, phase : rec > C | T }
=> { < I : Node | phase : ack, CONFIG-TIMEOUTalarm : noTimeValue,
FORCE-ROOTalarm : noTimeValue > C | T } .
rl [recLeader] :
{ < I : Node | neig : J, children : CHs, phase : rec >
(from J to I be my parent with delay 0) C | T }
=> { < I : Node | neig : empty, children : J CHs, phase : ack,
fr : false, FORCE-ROOTalarm : noTimeValue,
CONFIG-TIMEOUTalarm : noTimeValue > C | T } .
*** In the acknowledgement phase the node sends acknowledgements
*** "you are my child" to all the nodes which sent "be my parent"
*** in the previous phase.
rl [ack] :
{ < I : Node | children : J CHs, phase : ack > C | T }
=> { (from I to J acknowledgement with delay timeLink(I,J))
< I : Node | children : CHs > C | T } .
*** When all acknowledgements have been sent, either
*** the node has n children and therefore is the root node, or the
*** node sends a "be my parent" request on the so far unused
*** connection and awaits an acknowledgement from the parent.
*** (Leaf nodes skip the initial receive requests phase
*** and move straight to this point.)
rl [ackLeader] :
{ < I : Node | neig : empty, children : empty, phase : ack > C | T }
=> { leader I
< I : Node | phase : self > C | T } .
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rl [ackParent] :
{ < I : Node | neig : J, children : empty, phase : ack > C | T }
=> { (from I to J be my parent with delay timeLink(I,J))
< I : Node | phase : waitParent > C | T } .
rl [wait] :
{ < I : Node | neig : J, phase : waitParent >
(from J to I acknowledgement with delay 0) C | T }
=> { < I : Node | phase : self > C | T } .
*** Communication between nodes is asynchronous therefore
*** it is possible that two nodes might simultaneously request
*** each other to be its parent, leading to root contention
*** (each node wants the other to be the root)
rl [wait] :
{ < I : Node | neig : J, phase : waitParent >
(from J to I be my parent with delay 0)
< RAN : RandomNGen | seed : N > C | T }
=> { < I : Node | phase : contention,
rootConDelay : if (N % 2 == 0) then ROOT-CONTEND-FAST
else ROOT-CONTEND-SLOW fi >
< RAN : RandomNGen | seed : random(N) > C | T } .
rl [contenReceive] :
{ < I : Node | neig : J, phase : contention >
(from J to I be my parent with delay 0) C | T }
=> { < I : Node | neig : empty, children : J, phase : ack,
rootConDelay : noTimeValue > C | T } .
rl [contenSend] :
{ < I : Node | neig : J, phase : contention, rootConDelay : 0 > C | T }
=> { (from I to J be my parent with delay timeLink(I,J))
< I : Node | phase : waitParent, rootConDelay : noTimeValue > C | T } .
*** Timed behaviour
eq delta(< I : Node | phase : rec, CONFIG-TIMEOUTalarm : DT,
FORCE-ROOTalarm : DT’ >, T) =
if DT == noTimeValue then
(if DT’ == noTimeValue then
< I : Node | >
else
< I : Node | FORCE-ROOTalarm : DT’ monus T >
fi)
else
(if DT’ == noTimeValue then
< I : Node | CONFIG-TIMEOUTalarm : DT monus T >
else
< I : Node | CONFIG-TIMEOUTalarm : DT monus T,
FORCE-ROOTalarm : DT’ monus T >
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fi)
fi .
eq delta(< I : Node | phase : contention, rootConDelay : DT >, T) =
if DT == noTimeValue then < I : Node | >
else < I : Node | rootConDelay : DT monus T >
fi .
ceq delta(< I : Node | phase : PH >, T) = < I : Node | >
if (PH == ack or PH == waitParent or PH == self or PH == error) .
eq delta( leader I, T ) = leader I .
eq delta( error, T ) = error .
eq delta( from I to J be my parent with delay T, T’) =
from I to J be my parent with delay (T monus T’) .
eq delta( from I to J acknowledgement with delay T, T’) =
from I to J acknowledgement with delay (T monus T’) .
eq mte( from I to J be my parent with delay T ) = T .
eq mte( from I to J acknowledgement with delay T ) = T .
eq mte( leader I ) = INF .
eq mte( error ) = INF .
eq mte(< I : Node | neig : J K NEs, phase : rec, CONFIG-TIMEOUTalarm : DT,
FORCE-ROOTalarm : DT’ >) =
if DT == noTimeValue then
(if DT’ == noTimeValue then INF else DT’ fi)
else
(if DT’ == noTimeValue then DT else min(DT, DT’) fi)
fi .
eq mte(< I : Node | neig : J, phase : rec, fr : true,
FORCE-ROOTalarm : T >) = T .
eq mte(< I : Node | neig : J, phase : rec, fr : false >) = 0 .
eq mte(< I : Node | phase : ack >) = 0 .
eq mte(< I : Node | phase : waitParent >) = INF .
eq mte(< I : Node | phase : contention, rootConDelay : T >) = T .
eq mte(< I : Node | phase : self >) = INF .
eq mte(< I : Node | phase : error >) = INF .
crl [tick] : { C | T } => { delta(C, mte(C)) | T plus mte(C) }
if mte(C) =/= INF and mte(C) =/= 0 .
endom)
A.3 Search strategy
(fth AMODULE is
including META-LEVEL .
op MOD : -> Module .
op labels : -> QidList .
endfth)
(fmod SEARCH[M :: AMODULE] is
sort TermSet .
subsort Term < TermSet .
A.3 Search strategy 35
vars T T’ : Term . var TL : TermList . var TS : TermSet .
var N : MachineInt . var L : Qid . var LS : QidList .
var SB : Substitution .
*** Extension of TermList with an identity element
op ~ : -> TermList .
eq ~, TL = TL .
eq TL, ~ = TL .
op extTerm : ResultPair -> Term .
eq extTerm({T, SB}) = T .
op meta-apply’ : Term Qid MachineInt -> Term .
op allRew : Term QidList -> TermList .
op topRew : Term Qid MachineInt -> TermList .
eq meta-apply’(T, L, N) =
extTerm(meta-apply(MOD, T, L, none, N)) .
eq allRew(T, nil) = ~ .
eq allRew(T, L LS) = topRew(T, L, 0) , allRew(T, LS) .
eq topRew(T, L, N) =
if meta-apply’(T, L, N) == error* then ~
else (meta-apply’(T, L, N) , topRew(T, L, N + 1)) fi .
*** Term sets
op ‘{‘} : -> TermSet .
op _U_ : TermSet TermSet -> TermSet [assoc comm id: {}] .
op _isIn_ : Term TermSet -> Bool .
eq T U T = T .
eq T isIn {} = false .
eq T isIn (T’ U TS) =
if meta-reduce(MOD, ’_==_[T, T’]) == {’true}’Bool then true
else (T isIn TS) fi .
*** All solutions
op allSol : Term -> TermSet .
eq allSol(T) = allSolDepth(meta-reduce(MOD,T), {}) .
op allSolDepth : TermList TermSet -> TermSet .
eq allSolDepth(~, TS) = {} .
eq allSolDepth( T, TS ) =
if T isIn TS then {}
else ( if allRew(T, labels) == ~ then T
else allSolDepth(allRew(T, labels), TS U T)
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fi )
fi .
eq allSolDepth( (T, TL), TS ) =
if T isIn TS then allSolDepth(TL, TS)
else ( if allRew(T, labels) == ~ then
( T U allSolDepth(TL, TS) )
else allSolDepth((allRew(T, labels), TL), TS U T)
fi )
fi .
endfm)
A.4 Examples
The module TIMEDEXAMPLE (metarepresented) is used to instantiate the generic module
SEARCH, and this instantiation is in module SEARCH-FW.
(omod TIMEDEXAMPLE is
protecting TIMEDFIREWIRE .
ops network2 network3 network4 network6 network7 : -> Configuration .
op defaultATTRS : -> AttributeSet .
eq defaultATTRS = children : empty, phase : rec, fr : false,
FORCE-ROOTalarm : noTimeValue, CONFIG-TIMEOUTalarm : CONFIG-TIMEOUT,
rootConDelay : noTimeValue .
eq network2 =
< ’a : Node | neig : ’b, defaultATTRS >
< ’b : Node | neig : ’a, defaultATTRS >
< ’Random : RandomNGen | seed : 17 > .
eq network3 =
< ’a : Node | neig : ’b ’c, defaultATTRS >
< ’b : Node | neig : ’a ’c, defaultATTRS >
< ’c : Node | neig : ’a ’b, defaultATTRS >
< ’Random : RandomNGen | seed : 17 > .
eq network4 =
< ’a : Node | neig : ’c, defaultATTRS >
< ’b : Node | neig : ’c, defaultATTRS >
< ’c : Node | neig : ’a ’b ’e, defaultATTRS >
< ’e : Node | neig : ’c, defaultATTRS >
< ’Random : RandomNGen | seed : random(20) > .
eq network6 =
< ’a : Node | neig : ’c, defaultATTRS >
< ’b : Node | neig : ’c, defaultATTRS >
< ’c : Node | neig : ’a ’b ’e, defaultATTRS >
< ’e : Node | neig : ’c ’f ’g, defaultATTRS >
< ’f : Node | neig : ’e, defaultATTRS >
< ’g : Node | neig : ’e, defaultATTRS >
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< ’Random : RandomNGen | seed : 13 > .
eq network7 =
< ’a : Node | neig : ’c, defaultATTRS >
< ’b : Node | neig : ’c ’d, defaultATTRS >
< ’c : Node | neig : ’a ’b ’e, defaultATTRS >
< ’d : Node | neig : ’b, defaultATTRS >
< ’e : Node | neig : ’c ’f ’g, defaultATTRS >
< ’f : Node | neig : ’e, defaultATTRS >
< ’g : Node | neig : ’e, defaultATTRS >
< ’Random : RandomNGen | seed : 13 > .
eq timeLink(’a,’b) = 10 .
eq timeLink(’a,’c) = 7 .
eq timeLink(’b,’c) = 7 .
eq timeLink(’b,’d) = 10 .
eq timeLink(’c,’e) = 40 .
eq timeLink(’e,’f) = 7 .
eq timeLink(’e,’g) = 7 .
var I J : Qid .
ceq timeLink(J,I) = timeLink(I,J) if I < J .
op _&_ : ClockedSystem ClockedSystem -> ClockedSystem [assoc comm] .
var S : ClockedSystem .
eq S & S = S .
endom)
(mod META-FIREWIRE is
including META-LEVEL .
op METAFW : -> Module .
eq METAFW = up(TIMEDEXAMPLE) .
op labelsIDs : -> QidList .
eq labelsIDs = (’rec ’error ’stopAlarm ’recN-1 ’recLeader
’ack ’ackLeader ’ackParent ’wait
’contenReceive ’contenSend ’tick ) .
endm)
(view ModuleFW from AMODULE to META-FIREWIRE is
op MOD to METAFW .
op labels to labelsIDs .
endv)
(mod SEARCH-FW is
protecting SEARCH[ModuleFW] .
op downSol : TermSet -> Term .
var T : Term .
var TS : TermSet .
eq downSol({}) = error* .
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eq downSol(T) = T .
ceq downSol(T U TS) = ’_&_[T, downSol(TS)] if TS =/= {} .
endm)
*** Section 4.4
(select TIMEDEXAMPLE .)
(rew { network7 | 0 } .)
*** Section 5.3
(select SEARCH-FW .)
(down TIMEDEXAMPLE :
red downSol(allSol(up(TIMEDEXAMPLE, { network7 | 0 }))) .)
